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Sclerotic	soft	law:	Understanding	the	role	of	the	Minsk
Group	in	the	Nagorno-Karabakh	conflict
The	decades-old	dispute	between	Armenia	and	Azerbaijan	over	the	region	of	Nagorno-Karabakh	has	been
reignited,	with	forces	fighting	for	the	two	sides	engaged	in	intense	fighting	since	the	end	of	September.
Christopher	R.	Rossi	writes	that	the	recent	escalation	might	prompt	a	reassessment	of	the	‘soft	law’	approach
embodied	by	the	Minsk	Group,	which	was	formed	from	the	Organization	for	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe
(OSCE)	in	1992	to	mediate	over	the	conflict.
Did	the	metaphor	ever	aptly	fit?	The	‘frozen	conflict’	between	the	ethnically	Armenian	and	Christian	inhabitants	of
the	breakaway	enclave	of	Nagorno-Karabakh	and	the	Muslim-majority	neighbouring	Azerbaijan	has	once	again
melted.	A	torrent	of	cross-border	hostility	not	seen	for	a	quarter-century	burst	forth	in	late	September,	with	concerns
of	inundating	the	wider	region	in	ethnic	enmity	and	historical	memory.
Behind	the	gate	of	the	Line	of	Contact	stand	Russia	in	support	of	Armenian	interests	(with	delicately	balanced
Azerbaijani	interests,	as	well),	and	Turkey	in	support	of	Azeri	interests.	Reports	of	Turkish-recruited	Syrian
mercenaries	and	substantial	upgrades	to	the	Azeri	arsenal,	including	the	deployment	of	attack	(as	opposed	to
reconnaissance)	drones	and	electronic	war	systems,	add	tactical	and	technological	advancements	that	again	draw
into	question	the	ice-entombed	description	of	the	conflict	as	frozen.
If	it	is	more	apt	to	refer	to	this	conflict	as	unresolved	rather	than	frozen,	it	may	be	worth	questioning	the	actions	of
the	Minsk	Group,	which	was	formed	from	the	Organization	for	Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe	(OSCE)	in	1992
to	mediate	if	not	monopolise	stewardship	over	the	conflict.	This	closed	group,	composed	of	France,	the	United
States,	and	Russia,	has	been	unable	to	broker	a	negotiated	solution	and	currently	has	been	criticised	for	its	glacial
approach	to	visionary	thinking,	its	pathological	commitment	to	secrecy,	and	its	artful	vagueness	except	in	terms	of
wanting	to	keep	the	violence	from	spreading.
Some	of	the	criticisms	relating	to	the	Minsk	Group’s	inaction	focus	on	the	many	cross-cutting	energy,	trade,	and
security	interests	affecting	major	power	interests	in	the	overlapping	neighbourhoods	of	the	South	Caucasus.	The
complicated	effects	of	the	Armenian	diaspora	add	texture	and	complexity	to	the	Minsk	Group’s	mission,	and	to	the
domestic	politics	of	the	three	principal	co-chairs.
However,	asymmetric	relations	within	the	Group	may	also	account	for	its	inability	to	broker	a	settlement.	Observers
perceive	Russia	as	outmanoeuvring	the	other	principals,	delicately	nurturing	interests	on	both	sides	of	the	Line	of
Contact	while	benefitting	more	from	the	low-grade	conflict	than	its	resolution.	The	United	States	and	France	may
recognise	that	their	out-of-region	status	secures	for	them	more	influence	only	by	maintaining	their	seats	at	the
negotiating	table	to	monitor	and	check	Russian	interests	as	much	as	to	secure	a	meaningful	resolution	to	the
conflict.
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Ilham	Aliyev,	President	of	Azerbaijan,	receiving	OSCE	Minsк	Group	co-chairs	at	a	meeting	in	2019,	Credit:	President.az	(CC	BY	4.0)
The	Minsk	Group	has	received	praise	for	articulating	a	roadmap	for	peaceful	settlement	with	the	2007	Madrid
Principles.	These	principles	called	for	returning	of	the	illegally	seized	territories	surrounding	Nagorno-Karabakh	to
Azerbaijan,	guaranteeing	Nagorno-Karabakh’s	security	and	self-rule,	establishing	a	corridor	linking	Armenia	to
Nagorno-Karabakh,	forging	a	pactum	de	contrahendo,	whereby	the	parties	commit	to	the	future	peaceful	resolution
of	Nagorno-Karabakh’s	final	legal	status,	re-establishing	the	rights	of	all	internally	displaced	persons,	and	providing
for	security	and	international	peacekeeping	operations.	These	principles	provide	the	structure	to	which	the	Minsk
Group	and	the	warring	parties	need	to	return.	The	inability	to	return	to	the	Madrid	Principles	indicts	the	status	of	the
soft	law	formula	created	by	the	OSCE.
International	relations	specialists	debate	the	repositioning	of	sovereignty	as	something	more	than	a	territorially-
based	power	system.	Historically,	that	power	system	revolved	around	states	and	the	status	conferring	privileges	of
Eurocentric	decision-making	that	developed	out	of	Roman	law’s	idea	of	the	father	of	the	household	(patria	potestas)
and	the	feudal	concept	of	grandeur	(majestas).	Sovereignty	produced	a	system	dominated	by	Great	Power
relations,	which	increasingly	turned	toward	a	process	of	multilateralism	in	the	twentieth	century.
Some	theorists	have	noted	a	postmodern	estrangement	with	the	process	of	multilateralism,	which	in	decision-
making	forums	proved	cumbersome,	formalistic,	and	structurally	asymmetric.	New	status-conferring	and	mission-
centric	arrangements	arose	out	of	diplomatic	‘coalitions	of	the	willing.’	Such	examples	include	Troikas,	Wise	Men,
the	G8,	IGAD,	the	Arctic	5,	the	Six	and	Three-Party	Talks	about	arms	control	on	the	Korean	Peninsula,	and	the
United	Nations	Group	of	Friends,	and,	of	course,	the	Minsk	Group.
Soft	law	forums	were	intended	to	shift	the	centre	of	gravity	away	from	the	formalistic	and	legislative	workings	of
multilateralism.	They	called	on	a	process	of	norm	socialization	that	promoted	flexibility,	informality,	comity	and
compliance	in	a	way	that	deliberately	minimised	the	publication	or	formalisation	of	obligations	and	standards	to
which	states	would	be	held.	Soft	law	meant	to	sidestep	the	calculations	of	loss	aversion	theory,	where	diplomats
might	worry	more	about	changes	to	policies	that	result	in	potential	losses	more	than	the	acquisition	of	equivalent
gains.	Soft	law	forums	were	meant	to	stimulate	problem-solving	rather	than	instantiate	diplomatic	rigor	mortis.
The	misperceived	frozen	conflict	of	Nagorno-Karabakh	has	much	to	do	with	the	hardening	of	the	soft	law	process
internal	to	the	Minsk	Group.	The	Minsk	Group’s	avoidance	of	the	strictures	of	institutional	fixity	and	transparency
proved	valuable	in	terms	of	creating	the	Madrid	Principles,	on	which	any	future	resolution	of	Nagorno-Karabakh’s
fate	needs	to	be	based.	However,	its	inability	to	capture	advantages	of	relevant	advocacy,	normative	standard-
setting,	agenda-setting,	and	persuasion	led	observers	away	from	the	metaphor	of	Nagorno-Karabakh	as	a	frozen
conflict,	and	toward	the	sclerotic	metaphor	of	the	Minsk	Group	as	a	soft	law	entombment	of	coronary	heart	disease.
For	more	information,	see	the	author’s	paper	on	this	topic	in	the	Texas	International	Law	Journal
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